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DAVID ANDREW MOOSMAN, * 
Defendant-Appellant. * 
STATEMENT OF ISSOES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This is an appeal from verdicts of guilty in the First 
Judicial District Court for Cache County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen sitting without a jury, to the 
crimes or Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Felony, in 
violation of Section 76-5-202 (1) (f) , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, ot Communications Fraud, a First Degree Felony, in 
violation of Section 7b-i0-lo0i(1) (e) , Utah Code Annotated ly5j, 
as amended, and of False or Fraudulent Insurance Claim, a Second 
Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-5zl and Section 76-6-
412 (1) (a) (i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
proceeding to try the Defendant without a jury when there had 
been no waiver of the jury. The case had originally been 
scheduled for trial with a jury. (R. pg 61) However, subsequent 
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to the matter having been scheduled for jury trial, for reasons 
which do not appear in the record, the jury was vacated and the 
trial proceeded without a jury. Both the record and the 
transcript of the proceedings are silent as to any waiver of a 
jury trial, and the Appellant contends that the trial should not 
have proceeded as a judge only trial absent the showing of a 
knowing and intormed waiver by the Defendant of his right to be 
tried by a jury. The Appellant further contends that the trial 
court erred in finding the Defendant guilty because there was 
insufficient evidence presented by the State to support a verdict 
of guilty as to any of the counts alleged in the Information. 
Finally, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 
allowing testimony to be given of the autopsy examination of 
Defendant's wife by a medical pathologist who was not present at 
the autopsy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Saturday evening, September 14, 1985, Tamara A. Moosman, 
the wite of the appellant, was killed in a single car accident in 
Logan Canyon, Cache County, Utah. The decedent and the appellant 
had traveled from Logan to Garden City for a dinner engagement 
and were returning to Logan at the time of the accident. 
At an area of Logan Canyon known as the government dugway, 
the appellant lost control of the 1977 Datsun pickup truck he was 
driving. The appellant was thrown from the truck at some point 
before the truck came to rest in the Logan River down a steep 
embankment from the roadway. The appellant has no memory of how 
the accident occurred. However, following the accident he made 
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his way down the embankment and offered assistance to his wire by 
pulling her from the wreckage. He placed her on the ground 
beside the river and then he climbed back to the roadway in an 
effort to stop a passing motorist for assistance. 
Mrs. Moosman was still alive when the appellant pulled her 
from the wreckage and when she was placed on the river bank. 
However, by the time help was summoned and arrived at the 
accident site, Mrs. Moosman had moved from the river bank and her 
liteiess body was subsequently found in the Logan River. There 
were no eyewitnesses to the death of Mrs. Moosman or to the 
accident itself. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant argues that Section 77-35-17(c) ot the Utah 
Code requires that felony matters be tried by jury absent an 
informed, intelligent and voluntary waiver by the defendant. The 
informed, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the defendant's 
right to a jury trial cannot be presumed where the record is 
silent as to (a) the existence of any waiver at all or (b) the 
circumstances surrounding any alleged waiver. Furthermore, the 
appellant argues that the evidence as heard by the trial judge 
was insufficient to support a conviction as to any ot the three 
separate counts alleged in the information, those being murder in 
the first degree, communications fraud and filing a false or 
fraudulent insurance claim. Finally, the appellant contends that 
the trial court abridged the defendant's right to confront 
witnesses when the court permittee the state's medical examiner 
who had not conducted the autopsy examination ot the decedent to 




THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE A JURY 
TRIAL TO A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH MURDER IN 
THE FIRST DEGREE, A CAPITAL FELONY, COMMUNI-
CATIONS FRAUDy A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, AND 
FALSE OR FRAUDULENT INSURANCE CLAIM, A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY, IS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHERE THE 
RECORD IS SILENT AS TO A WAIVER OF THE JURY 
TRIAL BY THE DEFENDANT AND ABSENT A SHOWING 
THAT THE WAIVER, IF ANY, WAS KNOWINGLY, 
INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 
Section 77-35-17 (c) , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
provides that a Defendant charged with a felony is entitled to a 
jury trial. The section provides: 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by 
jury unless the defendant waives a jury in 
open court with the approval of the court and 
with the consent of the prosecution. 
The matter was originally scheduled for a jury trial. 
(R.61) However, the trial proceeded without a jury and a careful 
examination of the record does not disclose a waiver, much less a 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver by the Defendant of his 
statutory and constitutional right to a jury trial. Absent such 
a showing, the Defendant submits that no assumption can be made 
as to a waiver or the voluntariness of such a waiver. 
In State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) this Court, in a 
per curiam decision, reversed Cook's conviction of Criminal 
Mischief, a Class "A" Misdemeanor, holding that the trial court's 
failure to provide a jury trial for a defendant charged with a 
felony offense is reversible error absent a showing that the 
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defendant had waived h i s s t a t u t o r y r i g h t to ju ry t r i a l in open 
cour t or on the r eco rd . 
In the Cook ca se the d e f e n d a n t had been charged wi th a 
felony offense and the case was o r i g i n a l l y se t for a ju ry t r i a l 
a t the time of a r ra ignment . Sometime following a r ra ignment , but 
p r i o r to t r i a l , a t a time when the defendant was not p r e s e n t , the 
p rosecu to r requested and was given a non- jury t r i a l s e t t i n g a f t e r 
d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y was p e r m i t t e d to wi thdraw as d e f e n s e 
c o u n s e l . This Court found nothing in the record in the Cook case 
to i n d i c a t e t h a t the defendant had waived h i s s t a t u t o r y r i g h t to 
a j u r y t r i a l , and i n f a c t , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e 
"unexplained vaca t ion of the t r i a l s e t t i n g i s u n j u s t i f i a b l e in 
view of the s t a t u t e ' s expressed language" . The Court fu r the r 
s t a t e d t h a t where no waiver of a j u r y was ever made by t h e 
defendant in open cour t or on the r eco rd , no such waiver wi l l be 
presumed from a s i l e n t r e co rd . (Supra a t 297) 
T h i s C o u r t h a s s e t g u i d e l i n e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e 
r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e not on ly a wa iver of a 
d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to j u r y t r i a l , bu t a l s o t h a t t h e waiver be 
vo lun ta ry and i n t e l l i g e n t . For example, see S t a t e v . G a r t e i z , 
688 P.2d 487 (Utah 1984) , which examined the waiver of a j u ry 
t r i a l by a d e f e n d a n t who had b e e n c o n v i c t e d in t h e F o u r t h 
D i s t r i c t Court for Mil lard County. In Gar t e i z the t r i a l judge , 
a t t h e b e g i n n i n g ot t h e t r i a l and in t h e p r e s e n c e of d e f e n s e 
c o u n s e l , emphasized, on the r e c o r d , t h a t defendant was waiving 
h i s r i g h t to a j u ry and fu r the r inqui ry was made with regards to 
the f ac t t h a t the defendant had "an abso lu t e r i g h t " to have the 
ma t t e r t r i e d by a j u r y . A fu r the r inqui ry was made as to whether 
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or not the Defendant was asking the court to allow him to waive 
his right to a jury. The trial judge also informed the defendant 
that the court could refuse to allow him to waive the right to a 
jury and that the prosecutor must also agree to the waiver. In 
each instance Garteiz acknowledged that he understood his rights 
with respect to a jury and the prosecuting attorney on the record 
waived the right to a jury trial before the trial court accepted 
the waiver. (Supra at pg 488). In a concurring opinion Justice 
Durham suggested that additional procedural safeguards might be 
implemented to assure that a criminal defendant understand the 
jury function and that the defendant's right to a jury trial can 
in no way be abrogated without his full, informed consent. 
Justice Durham suggests that a defendant's right to a jury trial 
is meaningless unless inquiry is made into the defendant's 
understanding of his waiver and a careful explanation is made of 
the waiver ot the right to a jury trial before the trial court 
accepts the defendant's waiver. (Supra at pg 489). 
In the Cook decision this Court cited Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah State Constitution and the United States Supreme 
Court case of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 20 L. Ed. 2d 
4 9 1, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968) as holding that "a criminal 
defendant's right to a jury trial is substantial and valuable and 
should be carefully sateguarded by our courts". (Cook, supra at 
pg 297). See also McCarthy v. United States, 395 U.S. 459, 22 L. 
Ed. 2d. 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969), which held that the detendant 
must understand the nature of his constitutional rights for there 
6 
to be a valid waiver of those rights. Such a holding is 
fundamental to due process. 
In the instant case, as in C_o£ k
 f the record of the 
proceedings in the trial court is silent as to the reason for 
vacating the jury trial setting. There is no indication that Mr. 
Moosman understood the implications ot a waiver of his right to a 
trial by jury, or even that he waived his right to have the 
matter tried by a jury of his peers. Following the rationale of 
this Court in both the Cook and the Gartei z decisions, the 
instant case should be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial with a jury. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF 
FIRST DEGREE MDRDER AND A FORTIORI DOES NOT 
SUPPORT FINDINGS OF GOILTY TO COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD AND FALSE OR FRAUDULENT INSURANCE CLAIM, 
This court, in State vs. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), 
enunciated the rule that verdicts from bench trials in criminal 
cases are subject to review under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard specified in Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and in so doing, rejected State vs. Isaacson, 704 P.2d 
555, 557 (Utah 1985) which had held that in both bench and jury 
trials the court would overturn a conviction only when "the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person 
could not have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt". 
Isaacson, 704 P.2d at 557. 
In State vs. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah App. 1987), the 
Court of Appeals cited the Walker case as interpreting the 
"clearly erroneous" standard to require: 
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that if the findings (or the trial court's 
verdict in a criminal case) are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made, the findings (or verdict) will be set 
aside. 
(Walker, 743 P.2d at 193; Wright, 744 P.2d at 317). 
This court in the Walker case further states that ". . • the 
appellate court may examine all of the evidence in the record" 
and that it must "reject [the trial court's] findings if it 
considers them to be clearly erroneous." Walker, 743 P.2d at 
193. 
Careful scrutiny of the record in the instant case discloses 
a number of erroneous findings by the trial court whicn are not 
supported by the evidence introduced at trial. For example, the 
trial court's finding at page 1647 of the record that the abrupt 
turning of the car by the appellant constituted an "intentional 
part on the part of the driver of running the car oft the road 
with the passenger in it with an escape route for himself" at a 
point which the trial judge described as " . . . one of the most 
dangerous parts in Logan Canyon, at a point conveniently just 
past the guardrail, at a point where an exit could be made if you 
do it quickly enough just as the car turns, in which you might 
let go of the steering wheel just as it existed (sic) off the 
shoulder of the road . . ." (Tr. pg 1647) is totally unsupported 
by the evidence. No testimony was ever presented by either the 
prosecution or the defense that this area of the Logan Canyon is 
one of the most dangerous parts in the canyon. Neither was there 
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testimony that the fall down the embankment was at a point 
conveniently past the guardrail. 
The facts are that the accident occurred during hours of 
darkness on a roadway which was not illuminated except by the 
headlignts of the appellant's truck. Based upon testimony of the 
expert witnesses the truck was traveling roughly 37 miles per 
hour when control was lost. Nevertheless, the trial court found 
the speed to be slower than the speed initially found by the 
experts, that is a speed of between 27 and 22 miles per hour 
which the court believed to be significant. (Tr. pg 1646) 
Irrespective of the speed of the speed of the Moosman vehicle, 
either 37 miles per hour or between 27 and 22 miles per hour, it 
was the opinion of the expert witnesses that the appellant would 
have left the vehicle at the same rate of speed as the vehicle 
from which he left. The appellant submits that based upon the 
evidence presented at trial there is no basis for the court to 
have found that the appellant calculated his exit from the 
vehicle to coincide with his being at a location "conveniently 
beyond the guardrail" where the appellant could jump at the least 
risk to himself. (Tr. pp 1647, 1650-510) 
Such a finding is a strained interpretation of the evidence. 
The expert witnesses produced by both the prosecution and the 
defense agreed that the defendant's reaction time and the physics 
of the accident would have prevented the appellant from opening 
the truck door and jumping out betore the truck left the 
pavement. Furthermore, the darkness of the canyon and the speed 
of the vehicle when control was lost mitigate against a finding 
that the appellant jumped clear of the out of control truck into 
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an area predetermined by the appellant to have provided himself a 
safe escape. 
The t r i a l court places great weight upon the testimony of 
the s t a t e medical examiner in concluding t h a t Mrs. Moosman's 
wounds were caused by having been struck by a blunt instrument 
and not by the accident i t s e l f or the action ot a body ro l l ing 
over in the stream on the rocks. (Tr. 1648-1650) The appellant 
submi t s , however, t h a t Dr. Sweeney did not have s u f f i c i e n t 
contact with the Mrs. Moosman during the autopsy examination to 
have formed an opinion as to cause of death. This issue is more 
fully addressed as Point I I I of appe l l an t ' s b r ie f . Suffice i t to 
say at t h i s po in t t h a t the t r i a l cour t er red in al lowing Dr. 
Sweeney's testimony for the reasons set for in Point I I I here in , 
and t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s having allowed the tes t imony over 
defendant 's objection and placing such weight on the testimony is 
a f u r t h e r e x a m p l e of t h e c o u r t ' s c l e a r e r r o r i n t h e 
in t e rp re t a t ion of the evidence presented at t r i a l . 
POINT I I I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE ASSISTANT MEDICAL 
EXAMINER WHO CONDOCTED THE AUTOPSY EXAMINATION 
OF DEFENDANT'S WIFE, AND IN SO DOING THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING HEARSAY TESTIMONY TO BE 
ADMITTED AS TO THE AUTOPSY, BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
NOT HAVING REQUIRED THE ASSISTANT MEDICAL EXAMINER 
WHO CONDUCTED THE AUTOPSY TO HAVE TESTIFIED BEFORE 
PERMITTING THE STATE MEDICAL EXAMINER TO TESTIFY 
AS TO HIS FINDINGS AND PROFESSIONAL OPINION 
CONCERNING THE AUTOPSY EXAMINATION, 
The Sixtn Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides in part that a criminal defendant shall have the right 
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him". U.S. Const. 
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Amend. VI. A criminal defendant enjoys similar rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution ot the State ot Utah. Utah Const. Art. I, 
Section 12. The right of confrontation has been statutorily 
defined as well. See Section 77-1-6(1) (d) , Utah Code Annotated 
1953f as amended. 
In Reardon v. Manson, 491 F. Supp. 982 (1980), the United 
States District Court for the District of Connecticut, on a Writ 
of Habeas Corpus from a state court conviction, under 
circumstances similar to the instant case, held that a 
toxicoiogist1 s testimony in which he relied upon the analysis of 
others with no firsthand knowledge of test results was hearsay, 
the receipt of which by the court operated as a denial of the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers. In 
Reardon the defendant had been convicted of a drug offense. The 
trial court had allowed one ot three state toxicologists to 
testify as to the testing of substances which were found to be 
controlled substances. On direct and cross examination the 
toxicoiogist conceded that his testimony had been based entirely 
on his observations of the results of tests which were conducted 
out of his immediate presence by laboratory chemists under his 
supervision and on oral or handwritten reports from these 
chemists. 
The Connecticut court held that the testimony of the state 
toxicoiogist was inadmissible hearsay, stating that "it is beyond 
dispute that the chemist's extra-judicial testimony constituted a 
central link in the prosecution of these petitioners". (Reardon 
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supra at pg 985). The court establisnea three criteria against 
which confrontation clause questions should be tested: 
First: is the hearsay testimony "crucial" to 
the prosecution1 s case or does it have a 
"devastating" eftect on the defense? Second: 
if so, has the prosecution carried its burden 
of establishing that the extra-judicial 
declarant is in fact not available? Finally: 
does the testimony bear other "indicia of 
reliability"? 
Following Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 
85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965), the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation 
has repeatedly been referred to as an "essential and fundamental 
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's 
constitutional goal." Reardon supra at 9b5; Pointer supra, 380 
U.S. at 405; Barber v. Paige, 390 U.S. 719, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255, 88 
S. Ct. 1318 (1968) . 
The Reardon court cited language from United States v. 
Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 80 n.34 (2d Cir. 1977) stating: 
It is clear that in the context of the 
confrontation clause the "witness against" 
the accused is the extra-judicial declarant, 
and not the live witness who merely narrates 
the hearsay at trial. 
In the instant case Dr. Edward S. Sweeney, the medical 
examiner for the State of Utah, testified from records and notes 
compiled by an individual identified as Dr. Salazar. (Tr. pp 
996-1034, 1108, 1542-1570). Dr. Salazar was identified as being 
a forensic pathology fellow as well as a medical examiner 
assistant, more a clerk at the time of the autopsy. (Tr. pg 
998). Dr. Sweeney testifiea that he was in and out during the 
autopsy, but that Dr. Salazar had the primary responsibility for 
performing the autopsy and, in fact, Dr. Salazar was the person 
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who performed the autopsy of Mrs, Moosman. (Tr. pg 999) . Dr. 
Sweeney f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he made no n o t e s a s t o any 
o b s e r v a t i o n s he may have had from the autopsy and t h a t any notes 
t h a t were made and r e l i e d upon by him for t h e b a s i s of t h e 
autopsy r e p o r t were made by Dr. S a l a z a r . (Tr. pp 999 and 1000) . 
Dr. Salazar wrote the r e p o r t . (Tr. pg 1001). No explana t ion was 
offered by the p rosecu t ing a t t o r n e y as to why Dr. Salazar was not 
c a l l e d to t e s t i f y . This i s not a case where the p rosecu t ion did 
not t r y hard enough to produce an under ly ing w i t n e s s . Here i t 
appears t h a t the p rosecu t ion simply did not t r y a t a l l . 
T r i a l counsel s p e c i f i c a l l y objec ted to the hearsay test imony 
of Dr. Sweeney and r e l i a n c e upon the e x t r a - j u d i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n s 
o t Dr. S a l a z a r as be ing v i o l a t i v e of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s S i x t h 
Amendment r i g h t of con f ron t a t i on of a c r i t i c a l w i t n e s s . (Tr. pp 
1002 and 1003) . T r i a l c o u n s e l ' s ob j ec t i on was overru led and Dr. 
Sweeney was permi t ted to t e s t i f y . (Tr. pg 1003) . 
Applying the c r i t e r i a enuncia ted in Reardon to the i n s t a n t 
c a s e , the Defendant was denied h i s r i g h t to confront a wi tness 
c r u c i a l to t he s t a t e ' s c a s e . The t e s t i m o n y of t he m e d i c a l 
examiner introduced the cause of death and theo r i zed as to the 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c r i m i n a l i nvo lvemen t in h i s w i f e ' s d e a t h . The 
test imony was c r u c i a l to the s t a t e ' s c a s e . 
No e f f o r t s were made t o p r o d u c e D r . S a l a z a r who had 
c o n d u c t e d t h e e x a m i n a t i o n and p r e p a r e d t h e r e p o r t . By no t 
producing the ac tua l examiner, a rguably the p rosecu t ion sh ie lded 
a l e s s experienced wi tness from the r i g o r s of c ros s examinat ion . 
F i n a l l y , t h e Defendant s u b m i t s t h a t the t e s t i m o n y of Dr. 
Sweeney l a c k s t h e " i n d i c i a of r e l i a b i l i t y " s u g g e s t e d by t h e 
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Reardon decision. Reardon suggests that "where an extra-judicial 
statement is crucial to a prosecutor's case and where the 
prosecutor fails to establish that he made a good faith eftort to 
produce the out of court declarant the admission of the statement 
constitutes a per se violation of the defendant's sixth amendment 
right without any need to examine other indicia of reliability." 
Reardon, supra, at 987. In the instant case, however, there is 
ample reason to determine that the testimony of Dr. Sweeney is 
unreliabie. 
Yet it is clear from the record that Dr. Sweeney conducted 
no part of the examination. He was involved only peripherally. 
The autopsy examination was conducted by a medical examiner 
trainee over approximately a two and one-half hour period. Dr. 
Sweeney was not present when any of the photographs were taken. 
He made no notes, wrote no portion of the report and prepared no 
memorandum regarding the autopsy examination or the cause of Mrs. 
Moosman's death. Dr. Sweeney was not present when the scalp was 
reflected, nor when the injuries were examined. The photographs 
were not taken until after the scalp had been reflected. No 
photographs were taken prior to the commencement of the 
examination. Nevertheless, Dr. Sweeney was permitted to testify 
from the report of another on an element as crucial as the cause 
of death. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 77-35-17 (c) of the Utah Code is specific as to the 
requirements for a waiver of a jury trial in felony matters. 
Nevertheless, a careful examination ot the record fails to 
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disclose that the appellant waived his right to a jury trial 
either in open court or through any other means. This court 
cannot presume that the defendant waived his statutory and 
constitutional right to a jury trial absent disclosure in the 
record that the defendant's waiver, if any, was knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entered and accepted by the court. 
In the absence of a jury, the trial court proceeaea to hear 
evidence and found the appellant guilty of each o£ the counts 
alleged in the information. However, the appellant submits that 
the evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of 
guilt was insufficient to support the conviction on any of the 
three counts. The appellant contends that constitutionally 
impaneled jury would have viewed the evidence differently than 
the trial court sitting without a jury. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this f& day of January, 1989. 
Robert W. Gutke 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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